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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-2550 
_____________ 
 
LAKESIA TRENT, 
                        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TEST AMERICA, INC.; AEROTEK SCIENTIFIC, LLC  
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-10-cv-01290 
District Judge: The Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 4, 2014 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  March 18, 2014) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge  
 
Lakesia Trent, an African-American female, applied for work with a 
temporary staffing agency, Aerotek Scientific, LLC, in late 2007.  Trent and 
Aerotek executed an employment agreement, which set forth, inter alia, her 
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compensation and a restrictive covenant precluding her from working for a client 
for 180 days after her relationship with Aerotek terminated.  In the event that Trent 
worked for a client of Aerotek within the 180 day period following the end of her 
employment, Trent would be obligated to pay Aerotek an amount equal to 320 
hours at her hourly rate.    
Aerotek placed Trent in a position as a gas chromatography analyst in the 
laboratory of Test America, Inc.  In August of 2008, Test America decided to 
discontinue its relationship with Aerotek, citing decreasing sales.  As a result, 
Trent’s employment through the agency ceased.  Test America expressed an 
interest in hiring Trent permanently, and tried to negotiate a reduction in Aerotek’s 
fees for Trent’s services.  Aerotek, however, was unwilling to compromise by 
lowering the agreed upon rate for Trent’s services.  Thereafter, Aerotek presented 
Trent with a few other employment opportunities.  Trent declined to accept them.   
In 2010, Trent filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Aerotek and Test America, asserting 
claims of race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act.  After answering the amended complaint, Test America and Aerotek 
filed motions for summary judgment.  The District Court granted the motions.  
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This timely appeal followed.
1
  
Before us, Trent challenges only the grant of summary judgment on her race 
discrimination claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  In Jones v. School 
District of Philadelphia, we noted that the same burden shifting framework 
articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green applies to Title VII and § 1981 
claims of race discrimination.  198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)); see also Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 
181-82 (3d Cir. 2009) (observing that “the substantive elements of a claim under 
section 1981 are generally identical to the elements of an employment 
discrimination claim under Title VII”).  Trent contends that she adduced a prima 
facie case of discrimination and that the District Court erred in concluding that she 
failed to demonstrate that she was terminated under circumstances that gave rise to 
an inference of race discrimination.  See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (instructing that the plaintiff must establish a prima facie 
case by showing that the adverse employment action occurred “under 
circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination”). 
According to Trent, there were inconsistencies and contradictions that demonstrate 
                                                 
1
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We 
exercise final order jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same 
standard that it applied under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.  Schneyder v. 
Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2011).  
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the proffered reasons for her termination were a pretext for race discrimination.  
These inconsistencies, in Trent’s view, provide the necessary inference of 
discrimination needed to establish a prima facie case. 
We have carefully reviewed the record.  We conclude that the District Court 
did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Aerotek and Test America.  
The circumstances surrounding Trent’s termination at Test America fail to give 
rise to an inference of race discrimination.  Although Trent is African-American 
and qualified for the temporary laboratory position under contract with Aerotek, 
she did not establish that other non-African-American temporary laboratory 
technicians under contract with Aerotek were treated more favorably.   
Even if we presumed that she established a prima facie case, Trent failed to 
cast doubt upon Test America’s articulated reasons for terminating her services.  
Test America explained that its sales were declining and it decided to discontinue 
using staffing agencies in order to reduce overhead.  Although Test America 
sought to permanently hire Trent, Aerotek would not agree to convert Trent’s 
status without the payment of its fees.   
Nor has Trent shown any circumstances that give rise to an inference that 
Aerotek discriminated against her on the basis of her race.  Aerotek informed her 
of some positions after Test America terminated its employment relationship with 
her, but Trent did not accept those positions.  Trent has not demonstrated that other 
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non-African-Americans with her technical background were treated more 
favorably by Aerotek. 
Trent contends she adduced sufficient facts to give rise to an inference of 
race discrimination, citing the different reasons given for her discharge.  In her 
view, Test America’s explanation that her termination was in response to fiscal 
concerns is contradicted by the explanation given by Tania Tydings, Aerotek’s 
Employee Relations Manager.  Tydings stated that Trent was terminated because 
of performance issues.  Tydings admitted, however, that she had no firsthand 
knowledge of Test America’s termination of Trent and explained that she cited 
performance issues only because of a February 2008 e-mail from Test America.  
That e-mail sought to negotiate a lower rate for Trent’s services because she lacked 
a college degree, needed more training, and cost more than employees retained 
through other staffing agencies.  According to Tydings, Aerotek refused to lower 
its rate in February or at any point thereafter.  In light of these circumstances, and 
mindful that Aerotek and Test America are separate business entities, we fail to see 
an inconsistency.   
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
 
